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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin Walter Metcalfe 
 
Master of Science 
 
Department of Geography 
 
March 2013 
 
Title: The Influence of Cognitive Style on Navigational Map Reading 
 
 
In this thesis, I discuss my recent research on the potential relationship between 
cognitive style and navigational map reading ability.  Behavioral geography researchers 
investigate navigation and a person’s knowledge of their environment. These activities 
have led to and continue to lead to theories about the underlying cognitive processes 
associated with map use and navigation.  Previous research has shown a positive 
relationship between geographic education and a person's ability to understand the 
environment around them.  Navigation, cognitive maps, mental rotation, map-based 
knowledge vs. route-based knowledge, and way-finding have all been identified as 
potential processes that people employ to travel around their environment.  By 
understanding how people behave, process information, solve problems, and make 
decisions this research hopes to bring to light traits that may be useful in furthering 
geographic education and, as a result, environmental understanding. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Do you have a good sense of direction?  Can you look at a map and navigate 
easily to your destination?  Or, perhaps, you get lost or turned around frequently while 
navigating?  Do you find yourself having trouble locating yourself or things near you on 
a map?   Behavioral geography researchers investigate navigation and a person’s 
knowledge of their environment. These activities have led to, and continue to lead to, 
theories about the underlying cognitive processes associated with map use and navigation 
(Montello et al. 1999).  Reginald Golledge's research has shown a positive relationship 
between geographic education and a person's ability to understand the environment 
around them (Golledge et al. 1995).  Navigation, cognitive maps, mental rotation, map-
based knowledge vs. route-based knowledge, and way-finding have all been identified as 
potential processes that people employ to travel around their environment (Driscoll et al. 
2005, Golledge et al. 1995, Lobben, 2004, Lyoyd and Bunch 2003, Montello et al. 1999).  
The processes that make up a person’s decision in those topics are still being investigated 
(Cornell et al. 2003, Kulhavy and Stock 1996, Lobben, 2004 and 2007, Stankiewicz et al. 
2006). 
In order to better understand these processes we must focus some attention on the 
people that engage in map use and navigation activities.  By understanding how people 
behave, process information, solve problems, and make decisions this research hopes to 
bring to light traits that may be useful in furthering geographic education and, as a result, 
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environmental understanding.  This thesis is situated within this general research area.  
My primary research question is: 
What is the relationship between age, gender, education level, 
spatial thinking ability, analytical thinking ability, creative 
thinking ability, cognitive style and navigational map reading?   
In general, I am interested in identifying the potential differential relationship 
between several independent variables (age, gender, education level, spatial ability, 
analytical thinking ability, creative thinking ability, and cognitive style) and a single 
dependent variable (navigational map reading, specifically self-location).  But, 
“measuring” how a person thinks about space can be a difficult endeavor to quantify with 
any certainty and conclusions are often questioned.  To be sure the results are a measure 
of the constructs, multiple measures are required.  As a result, the methods used  involve 
recruiting a diverse sample, approximating the general public, who complete several 
different “tests” that I hypothesize represent the independent variables listed above 
(discussed more thoroughly in Chapter III: Methodology).   
The diversity in work cited in this paper shows the wide range of topics and 
theories that contribute to our understanding of navigation and cognitive abilities.  By 
utilizing more current measures of both spatial cognition and cognitive style, this 
research aims to create a profile of good navigational performers.  My hope is that the 
results from this research will address suggestions to further investigate the 
characteristics of good map-reading and navigation performers in an effort to enhance the 
body of knowledge for cartographic and cognitive research.  My research also aims to 
understand the relationship between cognitive style and the task being performed. 
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Chapter II will address navigation concepts and findings in areas of spatial 
cognition, navigation, and map reading.  This includes a brief overview of the 
Navigational Map Reading Ability Test (NMRAT) (Lobben, 2007) employed in this 
research.  Following that is a discussion of the history and development of cognitive 
styles in psychology.  The chapter concludes with an overview of the Cognitive Style 
Index (COSI) (Cools et al., 2007) that is an instrument in this research study.   
Chapter III addresses the methodology used.  The chapter begins with a 
description of the four research instruments being used.  Following that is a review and 
analysis of the instrument reliability and validity.  Chapter III also addresses the creation 
of the participant pool and the testing procedure.  It concludes with information on the 
data recording methods and database storage protocol.   
In chapter IV, the results are presented with information about the independent 
and dependent variables being reviewed.  Also in chapter IV is the preliminary results of 
the linear regression analysis that was performed.   
Following that chapter is the general discussion of results in chapter V.  The 
results of the linear regression modeling are shown individually by variable and potential 
conclusions are suggested.  This chapter also addresses some of the issues found in the 
methods and procedures as well as potential solutions for future research.  Chapter V 
concludes with a brief summary of the findings. 
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CHAPTER II 
 BACKGROUND: SPATIAL COGNITION, NAVIGATION, MAP READING, 
AND COGNITIVE STYLES 
 
In the 19th Century, Charles Darwin wrote about the idea that among a human’s 
senses there may be a sense of direction.  This sense was not necessarily a perceptual 
sense, like sight or smell, but rather a more abstract instinctual sense that humans and 
animals developed for survival.  He theorized that this sense was a person’s ability to 
understand the location of things and travel without getting lost (Darwin 1883).   Of 
particular relevance to this thesis is geography and psychology research in spatial 
cognition, navigation, map reading, and cognitive styles.  What follows is a brief 
overview of these selected topics pertinent to the research presented later in this thesis.  
Also included are descriptions of two of the test instruments used in the experiment, the 
Navigational Map Reading Ability Test and the Cognitive Style Index. 
 
2.1. Spatial Cognition 
Spatial cognition has been measured and tested for more than 100 years in 
numerous studies (see reviews by Mohler 2008, and Lobben 2004).  In 1921, Thorndike 
published the first known reference to spatial ability, something he referred to as 
“mechanical intelligence”, which he described as “the ability to visualize relationships 
among objects and understand how the physical world worked” (p.143) and that it was 
separate from both the numerical and verbal intelligence measures (Thorndike 1921). 
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The field of spatial cognition further expanded from the mid-20th century work by 
Edward Tolman.  In 1948, he created the construct of a cognitive map as a metaphor for 
our understanding and representation of the environment around us.  These mental 
representations of space are the result of countless scenes and pieces of information about 
the physical environment, in which these scenes are preserved and organized in our 
memories to create our working knowledge that allows us to move about (Montello 
1992).  We access this information in a dynamic manner as we move about and interact.  
As we gather more information about an area, our cognitive maps become more complete 
as pieces begin to connect and overlap incorporating information from different sources 
and scales. 
Tests of spatial ability can be measured and recorded on several scales; each 
recruits a slightly different, but often overlapping set of psychological processes.  Figural 
space, vista space, environmental space, and gigantic space are identified, small to large 
respectively, as scales of thought (Hegarty et al. 2002).  Hegarty et al. (2002) also 
proposed that a self-reported “sense of direction”, established by their Santa Barbra Sense 
of Direction Scale (SBSOD), reflects a person’s ability to perform tasks on the 
environmental scale.  That is to say, that when asked if they have a good or bad sense of 
direction, the subjects response was found to correlate to their abilities on the 
environmental scale.   This scale combines the act of learning via locomotion or 
movement to integrate a series of views that change as you move through an environment 
(Hegarty et al. 2002).  A person’s rating of their sense of direction was found to be a 
reliable indicator of their performance on subsequent spatial tests (Cornell et al. 2003).  
Cornell and colleagues (2003) also wrote about the need to study people that exhibit good 
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orientation skills as they “may reveal the cognitive processes attributed to a good sense of 
direction” (p. 399). 
 Researchers have used a wide range of tests and tools in efforts to accurately 
measure cognitive spatial ability.  The recognition of scenes from a learned environment, 
retracing routes taken, sketching a map of the environment, route distance estimation, and 
pointing or orienting to nonvisible landmarks are some examples of tasks aimed to 
identify spatial thinking (Hegarty et al. 2002).  From a psychometric testing perspective, 
tests were focused on tasks like the mental rotation of shapes, solving mazes, and finding 
hidden figures (Carroll 1993; Eliot and Smith 1983; Lohman 1988; McGee 1979).  The 
goal of these tasks is to identify underlying cognitive processes associated with relevant 
task completion.  These tests often focus on small figural cartographically large scale 
space that would include pictures and small objects (Hegarty et al. 2002).   
As geographers and cartographers began encroaching on the realm of spatial 
abilities, many of the theories developed in psychology were adapted to better understand 
geospatial cognition (Golledge et al. 1992; MacEachren 1995; Lloyd 1997).  Geographers 
were more interested in the cartographically smaller scale human-environment 
interactions that can help explain spatial behavior and the processes used to acquire, 
process, and use spatial knowledge.  Geographers and cartographers, specifically, began 
to focus on “understanding spatial cognition as part of the overall cartographic process” 
(Lobben, 2004 p. 271).  Behavioral geographers investigate processes that affect way 
finding, environmental behavior, and environmental learning (Kitchin et al., 1997).  
Loomis et al. (2010) argued that individuals understand and experience places differently; 
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and that these differences were the result of the varied ways of gathering, organizing, and 
processing information. 
 
 
2.2. Navigation 
Tolman’s (1948) cognitive map construct was applied to explain the behavior of 
rats in a maze.  He theorized that the rats learned not by a simple stimulus-response 
mechanism but rather the accumulation of connections in the nervous system.  This 
information, however, was perceived as a cartographic representation and the information 
was stored in a specific spatial format that is similar or identical to that of a geographic 
map (Kuipers, 1982).  Later research argued that environmental knowledge is not 
consistent or neatly organized but rather a patchwork or collage of information 
(Montello, 1992). 
 In the process of collecting environmental information, a distinct difference is 
noted between information gathered by navigation and information learned from reading 
a map.  Navigation provides procedural type knowledge and map reading is more 
associated with survey knowledge (Llyod, 1989).  Navigation is a sequential encoding of 
relationships between objects that relies on the perceptual information gathered about the 
different elements in the environment (Allen et al., 1979).  Conversely, map learning is 
more centered on the overall knowledge of the relationships between objects in the 
environment, allowing for the simultaneous acquisition of distance and direction among 
objects and landmarks. 
 8 
 Landmarks play an important role in our navigation process.  They provide a 
reference point that allows spaces to be divided in our cognitive maps and for references 
to be made from that information (Presson and Montello, 1988).  Landmarks can be any 
number of objects; i.e.  roads, intersections, buildings, trees, rivers, or signs.  A visual 
landmark is an object that contains high informative value for navigation and orientation 
in an unfamiliar setting (Sorrow and Hirtle, 1999).  Information about these landmarks is 
acquired initially without specific information about the spatial relationships between 
them (Siegel and White, 1975).  Through experience, the sequential ordering of 
landmarks along a route occurs that leads to the understanding of the spatial relationship 
between them.  The knowledge of the spatial relationship allows for an understanding of 
the layout of the route and initially consists of small “minimaps” that are connected by 
landmarks (Siegel and White, 1975). 
 Geographer Reginald Golledge applied landmarks as the foundation of his anchor 
point theory (Golledge, 1979).  He theorized that anchor points gave structure to our 
mental representation and allowed for different segments, or minimaps, to be connected 
in to larger areas.  Most commonly, locations associated with the home, work, or 
shopping become known and related to the various connections between them. 
 Cognitive mapping and map-reading studies have been conceptualized and 
approached from numerous different angles.  Tobler (1976) focused on cognition of maps 
as a cartographic problem of data collection, projection and reception by the reader.   
Morrison (1976, 1996) concluded that a map-reader’s interpretation of map information 
is influenced by both the cognitive processes as well as information they previously 
acquired.  This conclusion resulted in most cognitive map-reading experiments falling in 
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to one of two broad categories: experiments that address strategies and experiments that 
focus on cognitive processes (Lobben, 2004).  The tasks within each category varied 
greatly.  Some reoccurring themes were “deciphering symbol meaning, route planning, 
self-locating, and text/image/geometry rotation” (Lobben, 2004 p. 272).  
 Researchers have further extended this research area through more recent foci on 
gender and age and their respective relationship to map use and navigation.  With regards 
to gender differences, Choi and Silverman (1997) found that women are more likely to 
navigate with landmarks than their male counterparts.  Liben (1995) found that men tend 
to have a greater knowledge of world geography.  Studies have also found that males use 
more Euclidian strategies (distances and directions) while females use topographic 
strategies (landmarks) (Dabbs et al. 1998; Choi and Silverman 1997; Galea and Kimura 
1993; Miller and Santoni 1982; Ward et al. 1986; Downs and Stea 1977).  McGuiness 
and Sparks (1983) asked subjects to draw a map of their school campus and found that 
female subjects placed more buildings, while male subjects used more roads and 
connectors.  The contribution of spatial abilities to navigation strategy and geographic 
knowledge has been found to influence these differences (Collins and Kimura 1997).  For 
instance, men outperformed women on spatial tests that required manipulation of objects 
in space (Collins and Kimura 1997; Goldstein et al. 1990; Kimura 1983; Kolb and 
Whishaw 1990; Linn and Petersen 1985). Women, however, outperformed men on tasks 
such as keeping track of and locating objects (Eals and Silverman 1994; Silverman and 
Eals 1992).  McBurney et al. (1997) found that women could remember the locations of 
previously viewed items better than men could, and James and Kimura (1997) found 
women superior in remembering specific objects located at specific places.  Dabbs et al. 
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(1997) theorized that object location memory promotes the use of landmarks in 
navigation. 
As humans age their ability to navigate in unfamiliar environments greatly 
diminishes (Burns 1999).  Researchers have found topographical disorientation as one of 
the earliest symptoms displayed by patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Pai and Jacobs 
2004).  Cushmen et al. (2008) found that younger participants acquired knowledge of 
presented environments faster and with more accuracy than their senior counterparts.  
Young adults have been found to use maps more effectively for spatial learning and recall 
more landmark locations after studying street maps than elderly adults (Meneghetti et al. 
2011; De Beni et al. 2006; Thomas 1985).  Researchers also found that older adults were 
slower and less accurate when tasked with learning specific routes on a map and then 
tracing them in the real-world environment (Carelli et al. 2011; Wilkniss et al. 1997).  
Having a map of the environment while they explored was found to not be beneficial to 
older adults’ ability to learn locations of objects either, suggesting that the ability to 
translate from map-reading to spatial navigation deteriorates with age (Sjoliner et al. 
2005).  
Of particular interest for this thesis is the potential relationship between cognitive 
abilities and navigational map-reading ability.  Several previous studies have indicated 
that higher scores on cognitive ability tests have correlated with higher scores on spatial 
cognition ability tests (Thorndyke and Stasz 1980; Sholl and Egeth 1982; Lloyd and 
Steinke 1984; Streeter and Vitello 1986; Kovach, Surrette, and Aamodt 1988). 
The focus of current research efforts is shifting more toward the processes, and 
their role, and away from the strategies map-readers are using.  Through fMRI 
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researchers have found consistent patterns of activity in the brain for navigation tasks 
(Maguire et al. 1999).  The medial and right inferior parietal cortex, the posterior 
cingulate cortex, parts of the basal ganglia, the left prefrontal cortex, the bilateral medial 
temporal region and the hippocampus proper all seem to be utilized in varying degrees 
during navigation tasks (Maguire et al. 1999).  These studies present strong evidence that 
for humans to navigate successfully, use of the prefrontal circuits and associated 
cognitive systems is required (Moffat 2009).  
 
2.3. Map Reading 
Through the use of maps, the knowledge at an environmental scale can be 
obtained.  Recently, geographers and cartographers are particularly interested in the 
process of map reading and spatial cognition (Lobben 2004).  Using map-reading 
strategies to complete map-reading tasks, map-readers may use different strategies based 
on their individual abilities (Lobben 2004).  From the cartographers, came the suggestion 
that research efforts should focus on both the map reader and the map-reading skills and 
abilities to gain a better understanding of how readers interpret the information on a map 
(Kolacny 1969; Ratajski 1973; Morrison 1976).  This thesis uses the Navigational Map 
Reading Ability Test (NMRAT) for assessing spatial navigation ability that relies heavily 
on map-reading skills and decision making abilities of participants to understand the 
stimuli presented to them. 
Spatial testing from psychologists has been primarily concerned with 
understanding spatial cognition as part of an overall cognitive process (Lobben, 2004).   
Psychologists have focused primarily on the human and less on the stimuli, often 
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resulting in crude approximations of maps that are little more than a few lines and shapes.  
Different types of maps, map quality, and their possible interactions with a subject have 
had little consideration (Liben and Downs, 1989).  Geographers use these methods from 
psychology and adapt them to better understand spatial behavior in the context of 
geographic specific theories of spatial abilities and cognition (Golledge, Dougherty, and 
Bell 1995; Golledge and Stimson 1997; Lobben 2007).  In the context of cognitive map-
design, the focus of research has been on improving maps as a means to communicate 
complex information or ideas (Montello 2002).   
Lobben (2004) described self-location as “a person’s ability to effectively relate 
clues on the map to the represented real world.”  Map readers achieve this task by using 
landmarks and relationship clues to formulate their position on a map.  Self-location is an 
event, versus a continuous process, that occurs at the start of navigation when a map 
reader must locate themselves on a map in order to proceed with navigation, then occurs 
again “when ‘double-checking’ location or correcting erroneous decisions” (Lobben, 
2004).  This self-location process is one of the key pieces of the Navigational Map 
Reading Ability Test (NMRAT) developed by Lobben (2007).   
 
2.3.1. Navigational Map Reading Ability Test (NMRAT) 
The NMRAT was created to answer the question about what abilities influence 
map navigation (Lobben, 2007).  The five abilities identified to test were: map rotation, 
place-recognition, self-location, route memory and environmental mapping.   Lobben 
also created the Real World Map Navigation Exercise (RWMNE) to assess the construct 
and criterion validity of the NMRAT. 
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Lobben (2007) states “self-location alone is a strong predictor of the highly 
complex and dynamic task of navigational map reading”.  Although there are more 
processes involved than the five included in the NMRAT, it is a strong start in narrowing 
down a process tree of navigational map reading.  Self-location is also identified as a 
potential key to teaching better navigational map reading skills.  There is a detailed 
description of the NMRAT in chapter three. 
 
2.4. Cognitive Styles 
 In 1977 Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, and Cox defined cognitive style as being 
the way in which a person perceives, thinks, learns, problem solves, and relates to others.  
Alternatively, the research of Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, and Yousry (1989) says 
cognitive style is the way people process and organize information and arrive at a 
conclusion based on their observations.  Cools, Van Den Broeck, and Bouckenooghe 
(2007), the creators of the Cognitive Style Index used in this research paper, define 
cognitive style as “the way in which people perceive environmental stimuli, and how they 
organize and use this information for guiding their actions.” 
 The differences in cognitive styles have been found to be of great importance with 
regards to decision making (Leonard et al. 1999).  Several studies have shown an innate 
preference in decision-making processes that are compatible with their cognitive style 
(Gardner and Martinko 1996; Hunt et al. 1989).  As time went by and more studies were 
published, the number of definitions and overlapping cognitive styles grew rapidly.  The 
increasing number of cognitive style dimensions and the measures that accompany them 
created a lack of unity and agreed upon definition despite having conceptually similar or 
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identical definitions (Grigorenko and Sternberg 1995; Hayes and Allinson 1994; Rayner 
and Riding 1997).  In the end it reduces the “usefulness and viability of the concepts” for 
most applications (Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith 2003). 
 To create some semblance of order and uniformity within the field, many have 
tried to categorize the theories that are similar conceptually and design-wise (Cassidy 
2004; Coffield, et al. 2004; Desmedt and Valcke 2004).  It has also been suggested that 
some variations of cognitive styles are in fact the same underlying dimensions 
conceptualized with slight differences but referencing the same idea (Allinson and Hayes 
1996; Riding 1997; Sadler-Smith and Badger 1998).  Miller (1991) suggests that there 
exists a dichotomy in how we process information and that this has been repeated 
throughout Western thought.  It is this duality in human thought that has been the focus 
of study for hundreds of years (Taggart and Robey, 1981).  The appearance of two 
qualitatively different cognitive styles is a common theme amongst many studies.  The 
commonly described analytical cognitive style has been labeled as many other things; 
deductive, rigorous, constrained, convergent, formal, and critical to name a few.  The 
creative style has a similarly long list of aliases; synthetic, inductive, expansive, 
unconstrained, divergent, informal, and diffuse (Nickerson, et al. 1985).  In 1996 a study 
by Allinson and Hayes labeled this the analysis-intuition dimension.  They define 
analysis–intuition mainly as a difference between rational and intuitive reasoning, 
stemming from left brain/right brain theories.  Again, however, numerous names have 
been coined to describe that same conceptual idea like analytic-non-analytic (Kemler-
Nelson 1984), analytic–holistic (Beyler and Schmeck 1992), or logical–nonlogical 
(Barnard 1938). The underlying distinction is between a cognitive narrowness and 
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broadness, or rational and intuitive thinking that continues to dominate current research 
on cognitive differences in behavioral and developmental psychology (Hodgkinson and 
Sadler-Smith 2003). 
 
2.4.1. Cognitive Style Index  
The Cognitive Style Index (COSI) (Cools et al., 2007) provides a participant’s 
score on each of three distinct cognitive styles.  Two of these styles, planning and 
knowing, are conceptually located in the classic analytical camp, while the creating style 
is firmly non-analytical.  There is a detailed description of the COSI in chapter III. 
  The planning style is characterized by a need for structure.  Planners control and 
organize the world around them and thrive in a well-structured working environment.  
They value preparation and planning in order to reach an objective.  They very firmly 
want other people to respect rules and agreements.  People with a planning style like rules 
and regulations, step-by-step explanations, and doing things the way they always have 
done.  They do not like ambiguity and prefer clarity and order. 
The knowing style is characterized by a need for facts and data.  They want to 
know as many facts and details as possible and know exactly the way things are.  They 
are detailed, task-oriented, and accurate.  They like complex problems if they can find a 
clear and rational solution. They make decisions using a structured approach. People with 
a knowing style have an enormous capacity for details, make errors rarely, and are good 
at demanding tasks.  
The creating style people like experimentation and creativity.  They think more on 
a conceptual level and are less interested in the practical implementation of ideas.  They 
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like uncertainty and freedom and see a problem as an opportunity or challenge to be 
overcome.  The creative style people prefer dynamic structures and are always looking 
for new opportunities and hidden possibilities. They value spontaneity and flexibility and 
tolerate ambiguity, especially if it creates new options. 
People with a creating style lean more towards innovation and “restructuring the 
situation” to make decisions and solve problems.  The knowing and planning style people 
have more of a tendency to think within the existing structure of the problem to solve it.  
The people with a creating style “do things differently” while people with a knowing and 
planning style try to “do things better” (Cools et al. 2007).  From the descriptions of 
Gryskiewicz and Tullar (1995) the creating style are more likely to be innovators and the 
planning and knowing style are adaptors. 
The link between cognitive style and ability has been a hotly contested subject 
among cognitive psychology researchers (Armstrong 2000; Furnham 1995).  Some argue 
that cognitive style and intellectual abilities are vastly different in many key ways (Kirton 
2003; Mudd 1996; Riding and Rayner 1998; Tullet 1997).  Opposing research suggests 
that there is a relationship between them (Allinson and Hayes 1996; Federico and Landis 
1984; Isaksen and Puccio 1988; Tiedemann 1989).  Cools and colleagues tested this 
theory with the results of the COSI and various academic results, such as standardized 
aptitude test scores and school grades, and found that there was no significant correlation 
between cognitive style and intellectual ability or attainment.  They suggested future 
research may investigate the influence of the type of task on the cognitive style-cognition 
relationship stating that “people have a preferred or dominant cognitive style, their actual 
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behavior and performance is also influenced by the demands of the situation or task” 
(Cools et al. 2007). 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 In behavioral research, the inherent nature of studying and theorizing the 
processes people follow that comprise actions and decisions are not tangible “things”.  As 
such, it presents a certain challenge to researchers to accurately and reliably generalize 
results about particular groups or individuals to say something about a general 
population.  Categorizing and analyzing results from behavior studies becomes a careful 
exercise in not overstating the results of tests and drawing conclusions that can be tested 
for reliability and validity.  Unlike the tests used in other fields, measuring soil particle 
size or soil profiles for example, the testing methods are often called in to question more 
than the results.  As a result, researchers and their results may benefit from multiple 
measures and well-constructed participant pools.  By including the NMRAT and COSI as 
instruments in this study, I have adopted “measures” of spatial cognition and cognitive 
styles that have been tested and validated in both laboratory and “real-world” settings.  
Because, when measuring the intangible cognitive processes, it is scientifically 
methodologically necessary to also assess the reliability and validity of the measurement 
instruments.  In the sections below, I briefly discuss these critical steps in the 
methodology I have adopted for my thesis research. 
 
3.1. Instruments 
 This study is comprised of four instruments: a demographic questionnaire; self-
rated ability scale (Cornell 2003); the Cognitive Style Index (COSI); and Navigational 
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Map Reading Ability Test (NMRAT).  All instruments were created and programmed in 
Adobe Flash using the ActionScrpit 3 language and then served via a secure website to 
participants.  The participant responses were recorded to a database on a secure 
University of Oregon server.   
 Instrument one is a brief survey to attain basic biographical data.  The purpose of 
this instrument is to obtain the independent variables for age, gender, and education.  The 
questions and possible “multiple-choice” responses are: 
1. How old are you? 
- 18-24 
- 25-34 
- 35-44 
- 45-54 
- 55-64 
- 65 and above 
2. Are you male or female? 
- Male 
- Female 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
- Primary School 
- High School 
- Some College 
- Associates or 2-year degree 
- Bachelor’s Degree 
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- Graduate Degree (e.g. M.A., M.S., Ph.D., M.D., Law Degree) 
 
Instrument two is a self-assessment of the participant’s ability to think in a 
particular thinking style.  How well do participants consider themselves able to think 
creatively, analytically, or spatially?  Cornel et al. (2003) found self-assessment to have 
moderate correlations to actual abilities in spatial testing.  It consists of a series of three 
questions, each on a 1-10 rating scale to estimate their thinking ability. 
Instrument three is the establishment of the participant's primary cognitive style 
using the Cognitive Style Index (COSI) developed by Eva Cools and Herman Van den 
Broeck (2007).  The questions categorize participants into “knowing”, “planning”, or 
“creating” cognitive styles with particular traits common among each group.  The 
development of the Cognitive Style Index (COSI) in 2006, presented a multi-study 
research approach developed over a period of six years (Cools et al. 2007).  Cools et al. 
began with 97 items, or questions, designed to evaluate how people perceive, process, 
and use information.  Through a pilot study with 15,616 participants, 18 items were 
retained and found to be psychometrically sound and used in the resulting validation 
studies.  The index was then tested for validity using 3 separate studies.  The results of 
these studies were judged based on convergent and divergent validity, meaning it is 
related to conceptually similar constructs and unrelated to conceptually dissimilar 
measures (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).  Cools et al. conducted a factor analysis and found 
three distinct cognitive styles.   
In instrument four, the second part of the study, participants were tested on the 
dependent variable of spatial orientation ability. This instrument used the self-location 
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section of the Navigational Map Reading Ability Test (NMRAT) (Figure 1).  This task 
asks participants to pick locate and orient themselves on a map given a picture indicating 
their surroundings.  The participants are shown a map with a red circle, indicating that 
they are located somewhere within that circle.  Next to the map is a picture of the 
environment visible from somewhere within that circle.  There are two possible 
orientation responses, in the form of red directional arrows, that the participant must 
choose from that best represents the probable view from the location.   
The NMRAT was designed as a sit-down group administered test on the 
computer.  The tasks asked participants to reach conclusions about the graphics displayed 
to them.  During the self-location portion of the test, participants were shown a 
photograph of an environment then asked to determine their location and orientation, 
using the clues within the photo that would match that photograph.  Participants were 
also informed that the purpose of the study was to assess map-reading ability. 
 Participants were later led through the RWMNE to separate the good and poor 
performers of map reading navigation.  This was to see what correlation existed between 
the five ability measures that comprised the NMRAT and the real world navigation 
abilities the participants possessed.  The RWMNE involved physically walking around 
and navigating from one point to another given the environment around.  It took place 
inside a building with a street network that ran through the complex hallways.  The 
hallways had street signs to help participants navigate.  This indoor environment allowed 
for more experimental control than if it were conducted outdoors. 
 A total of forty-five participants were tested with forty-four results being used in 
the analysis.  A multiple regression analysis was used to determine the relative influence 
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of each factor in predicting the score on the RWMNE.  The results showed that the 
NMRAT was overall a good predictor of real-world performance.  Some sections of the 
test proved to be more significant than others.  The results indicated that of the five 
constructs being tested, the self-location was the most influential.  As a whole it also 
showed that certain cognitive processes should be investigated further to identify more 
clearly their role in navigational map use. 
 
 
Figure 1: The self-location task of the NMRAT asks participants to choose an 
orientation arrow that would result in the view pictured if standing somewhere within the 
circle. 
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3.2. Instrument Analysis 
 The first and second instruments used in the study could be checked for reliability 
with a test-retest assessment to verify the consistency of participants’ answers.  However, 
given that no identifying information was collected about participants that may prove 
difficult.  Instead a larger subject pool was constructed in an effort to average out 
erroneous responses.  Instruments three (COSI) and four (NMRAT) of the research 
design are established testing methods that were tested for reliability and validity during 
their creation.  
 The instrument reliability of the NMRAT was tested using a split-half analysis, 
due to its construction as a speed test, which compares the consistency of two scores from 
equivalent halves of a test.  The split-half correlation of the four sections was found to be 
highly reliable.  The construct validity, or how well the test measure the theoretical 
construct, suggests how well the sections of test capture the map use constructs they were 
intended to measure.  This was determined by analyzing the relationships between each 
of the parts of the NMRAT and the scores from each of the individual parts of the Real 
World Navigation Map Exercise (RWMNE).  Results indicated that some of the sections 
of the NMRAT were more valid than others in predicting real-world performance, 
particularly the self-location portion being the most influential in predicting performance. 
The convergent and discriminant validity of the COSI was supported by including 
several other cognitive style instruments as well as personality and academic 
performance measures.  Criterion validity was established by the examination of the 
relationship between the cognitive styles and work-related characteristics.  Cools et al. 
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(2007) also used a split-half reliability test to establish test reliability.  All instruments 
were found to be reliable across the three studies used to develop the COSI. 
In testing the construct validity, Cools et al. also found the knowing and planning 
style to be positively correlated with the Rationality scale (as described in Edwards, 
Lanning, and Hooker 2002; Epstein et al. 1996; and Pacini and Epstein 1999).  This 
reinforces that both knowing and planning styles are located within the rational, analytic 
cognitive system.  The creative style, however, had no significant correlation with 
Rationality indicating they are less likely to process information primarily in an analytical 
mode.  Among the Rationality subscales, the knowing and planning styles diverge with 
significant differences.  The knowing style favored Rational Ability and Rational 
Engagement.  The planning style was positively correlated with Rational Ability but not 
Rational Engagement.  This means that although a planning style person has the ability, 
they may not actually engage in the Rational Thinking process, where a knowing style is 
more likely to. 
 
 
3.3. Participants and Testing Procedure 
 In constructing a participant pool you want a research pool that is large enough so 
you can identify groups based on performance. In this research, I have attempted to be 
intentional in my participant pool characteristics and construction.  Steps for recruiting:  
recruit as many people from as many different backgrounds as possible.  Realistically, 
most of the recruiting will be done on campus, limiting the age and education level 
spectrum.  However, because I am testing more innate abilities, rather than learned skills, 
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I feel that I can adequately identify performance groups recruited from campus, 
primarily.  This recruiting and selection method has been used successfully by Lobben & 
Lawrence (in progress a,b) and Lobben et al. (2005).  
Again, because one of my objectives is to generalize my results so I may make 
statements about spatial abilities and cognitive styles of the general public, I will, as 
much as possible, recruit participants from a wide array of age and gender groups as well 
as education levels.   
Additionally, because individual differences in navigation and spatial abilities 
have been identified (Lobben and Lawrence, in progress), I will also develop participant 
groups based on their recorded self-assessed ability levels in analytical, creative, and 
spatial thinking abilities.  Since it is difficult to test for that beforehand, a large enough 
sample will be used to find an adequate sample of people that excel in each category.  
Although this is not a representation of the general public, the participant group should 
represent a large spectrum of values for the independent variables. 
 The participant’s information was kept confidential with no identifying 
information being taken.  The study received the approval of the Institutional Review 
Board (Protocol 05232011.034) for the involvement of human participants.  Since the test 
is administered online, the risk to participants is deemed to be minimal.  The survey 
includes a clause that by taking the survey, participants are consenting to submitting the 
information to the study. 
The pilot-test participant group, consisting of thirty-two participants, was 
recruited initially by the use of advertisements, listservs, and a website.   Several listservs 
were identified that contain sufficient populations that might be interested in participating 
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in the study.  The participants were directed to a website that loads and proctors the test.  
The testing ran for two weeks until a sufficient number of participants to be confident 
that the results are not being skewed by individual results. 
 After analysis of the pilot-test responses a larger testing pool was recruited using 
various internet forums and email “listservs” that are believed to contain populations that 
would help “round out” the subject pool.  Additionally, participants were recruited during 
several days at the Holiday Market hosted at the Lane County Fair Grounds.  Subjects 
from the market received $20 in compensation for their participation.  To avoid potential 
abuse, such as taking the test multiple times, the days and times of testing were not 
distributed.  Participants recruited from the market were also required to complete a paper 
version of the participation waiver for records (See Appendix A).  54 participants were 
recruited from the Holiday Market with 77 responses coming from online recruitment 
sources. 
Since no identifying information was recorded during the test taking process, the 
individual records are impossible to match to a specific user.  This does open up the 
remote possibility of the results being skewed by multiple responses by the same person.  
This seems highly unlikely due to the time required and static and repetitive nature of the 
test, but a possibility that must be acknowledged. 
  
3.4. Data Recording and Database Construction 
 The testing was done at the participant’s selected pace with no imposed time 
restrictions.  The testing process took no more than 15 minutes with most participants 
completing the test in less than 10 minutes.  Variables for question response and response 
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time were recorded in to an array via ActionScript 3 and sent through an .ASP script that 
wrote to a secure Microsoft Access Database.  The information gathered was written to a 
secure server at the University of Oregon.  All the information is stored electronically and 
backed up with an external data storage medium in a securely locked location. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
The primary analysis of the data collected from the four test instruments consisted 
of a multiple linear regression model to ascertain if any of the independent variables (age, 
gender, education level, analytical thinking ability, creative thinking ability, spatial 
thinking ability, and Cognitive Style) can significantly explain the variation in the 
dependent variable of NMRAT self-location score.  Since several variables are being 
analyzed a multiple linear regression approach is used instead of a series of simple, or 
single, linear regressions.  The multiple regression analysis tells how well all the 
independent variables collectively predict the dependent variable.  The multiple 
regression analysis also tells how well each independent variable predicts the dependent 
viable, controlling for the other independent variables.  The analysis tells you if a model 
or variable can predict the output, given the input, at a rate better than chance with the p-
statistic.  For this thesis, statistical significance is defined as a p-value of less than .05. 
This chapter will look at the range and distribution of responses for each of the 
independent variables.  Following the independent variable review will be a description 
of the results of the NMRAT self-location test, again showing range and distribution.  
The chapter will conclude with a section explaining the results on the multiple linear 
regression models. 
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4.1. Number of Observations 
A total of 163 subjects participated in the experiment.  The subjects that 
participated represent the total number “n” for the experiment.  Initially the results were 
surveyed to ensure that each of the participants completed the entire test.  The experiment 
also recorded a variable for the amount of time each participant took to answer each 
question as well as the cumulative time to complete the test.  Upon analysis of this 
variable, a high likelihood existed that six of the respondents simply clicked through the 
test as quickly as possible.  The mean response time and cumulative response time of 
each of these six was more than two standard deviations lower than the average response 
time.  Most importantly, response times were relatively uniform across the test despite 
the change in tasks or the amount of text the participants were required to read.  As such, 
these results were omitted from further analysis.  This resulted in 157 results used in the 
following analysis (n=157).  This method is described by Whelan (2010) as a means to 
control for “fast guesses” that do not actually consider the stimuli being presented in 
reaction time based psychological testing. 
 
4.2. Independent Variables 
 The test presented in this thesis gathered information on six independent 
variables.  As described in Chapter III, the survey gathered information about the age 
category and gender of participants.  The next question asked participants to indicate the 
highest level of education they had completed.  For the next independent variables, 
participants indicated their ability to think analytically, creatively, and spatially, on a 
scale ranging from 1-10.  The final independent variable is the score on the three 
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Cognitive Styles tested by the COSI.  A further discussion of the results is located in 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.2.1. Age 
The participants represented a wide range of age values, populating all of the age 
category options (Figure 2).  Twenty-six respondents (16.5 percent) reported being 18-24 
years old and four participants (2.5 percent) indicating they were 65 years of age or older.  
The most common age categories were 25-34 (32 percent) and 35-44 (34 percent). 
 
 
Figure 2: Reported age category of experiment participants. 
 
The results from the Age variable are shown in Table 1 and Figure 3.  The 45-54 
age category had the highest average score (12.86). It is in the 55 and older categories 
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that the decline a performance seems to appear with those groups scoring an average of 
10.77 (55-64) and 10.5 (65 and older) on the NMRAT test.   
 
Table 1: Shows the calculated average scores by reported age category. 
Age Category  Average Score
1. 18‐24  12.38461538 
2. 25‐34  12.42 
3. 35‐44  12.49056604 
4. 45‐54  12.86666667 
5. 55‐64  10.77777778 
6. 65+  10.5 
 
 
Figure 3: Shows the NMRAT score by self-reported age category and the trend line from 
the linear regression analysis. 
 
4.2.2. Gender 
The second variable, gender, shows the sample population comprised a fairly 
even amount of participants that were male and female at 87 (55 percent) and 70 (45 
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percent), respectively (Figure 4).  Results from this study (Table 2 and figure 5) indicated 
only a slightly higher average score for men (12.48 for the men and 12.15 for the 
women). In this subject pool the NMRAT Self-location test performance is similar 
between genders.   
 
 
Figure 4: Shows the gender reported by participants. 
 
Table 2: Shows the calculated average score by reported gender. 
Gender  Average Score
Male  12.48275862 
Female  12.15714286 
 
 33 
 
Figure 5: Shows the NMRAT score by self-reported gender and the trend line from the 
linear regression analysis. 
 
 
4.2.3. Education 
The number of respondents within each education category was not as evenly 
distributed as initially intended.  54 (31 percent) of the 157 respondents indicated have 
completed a graduate level degree (Figure 6,7 and Table 3).  Recruiting from technical 
and specialty internet forums and academic listservs could have biased this result due to a 
higher level of education required in academia or GISciences. 
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Figure 6: Shows the number of participants for each level of education. 
 
Table 3: Shows the calculated average score by education level. 
Education  Average Score
2. High School  N/A 
3. Some College  12.4 
4. Associate's Degree  11.66666667 
5. Bachelor's Degree  12.72857143 
6. Advanced Degree  11.98648649 
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Figure 7: Shows the NMRAT score by self-reported education level and the trend line 
from the linear regression analysis. 
 
4.2.4. Analytical Thinking Ability 
 The self-reported analytical thinking ability shows a negatively skewed 
distribution with a mode response value of “10” on the 1-10 scale (Figure 8).  The 
distribution has a skewness of -0.8889 and an excess kurtosis value of .451 giving the 
data a larger than standard peak.  The median value of the responses was 8.  There were 
no “1’ responses given and only sixteen of the 157 total participants indicated having an 
analytical thinking ability of five or less. 
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Figure 8: Histogram showing the participants response to the self-reported analytical 
thinking ability question on a 1-10 scale with a “1” indicating a low ability. 
 
The average scores and analytical thinking ability value (Table 4) shows a large 
average value for both “2” and “5”.  In looking at the individual responses there is only a 
single response in the “2” category, due to this it could be an anomaly associated with too 
small of a sample size.  The “5” value had seven responses, again representing a 
relatively small portion of responses compared to the other larger values (6=17, 7=23, 
8=35, 9=30, 10=36).  The higher values with larger populations do show a positively 
sloped trend line of increasing score (Figure 9).  
 
Table 4: Shows the calculated average score by self-reported analytical thinking ability. 
Analytical Thinking 
Ability  Average Score
1  N/A 
2  14 
3  10.2 
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4  11 
5  14.42857143 
6  12.52941176 
7  11.7826087 
8  12.25714286 
9  12.46666667 
10  12.52777778 
 
 
Figure 9: Shows the NMRAT score versus self-reported analytical thinking ability and 
the trend line from the linear regression analysis. 
 
4.2.5. Creative Thinking Ability 
The median value of respondent’s creative thinking ability was 7 with a mode 
value of 7.  There was a single response for the value of “1” and twenty six of the 157 
total responses indicating a creative thinking ability of five or less.  The values are more 
normally distributed than the results of the analytical thinking ability question, but still 
skewed negatively to the left with a skewness value of -0.5689 and a slightly larger peak 
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than a standard normal distribution with an excess kurtosis value of 0.6188 (Figure 10, 11 
and Table 5). 
 
 
Figure 10: Histogram showing the participants response to the self-reported creative 
thinking ability question on a 1-10 scale with “1” indicating a low ability.  
 
Table 5: Shows the calculated average score by self-reported creative thinking ability. 
Creative Thinking 
Ability  Average Score
1  11 
2  N/A 
3  11.5 
4  12.3 
5  12.81818182 
6  12.25 
7  12.3125 
8  12.14285714 
9  13.2 
10  11.77777778 
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Figure 11: Shows the NMRAT score versus self-reported creative thinking ability and the 
trend line from the linear regression analysis. 
 
4.2.6. Spatial Thinking Ability 
The median value of the spatial thinking ability question was 7 and a mode of 8.  
Of note is the larger spread of the values for spatial thinking with forty two (26.8 percent) 
of the 157 responses indicating they are on the lower side (a value of five or lower) of the 
spatial ability thinking scale, but no responses of “1”.  With a skewness value of -0.5050, 
the data is slightly negatively distributed and a kurtosis value of -0.5105 showing it has a 
relatively flat peak compared to a standard distribution. 
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Figure 12: Histogram showing the participants response to the self-reported spatial 
thinking ability question on a 1-10 scale with “1” indicating a low ability. 
 
Table 6: Shows the calculated average score by self-reported spatial thinking ability. 
Spatial Thinking Ability  Average Score
1  N/A 
2  10.25 
3  12.45454545 
4  12.5 
5  12.39130435 
6  12.33333333 
7  12.27272727 
8  12.86486486 
9  11.77272727 
10  12.3125 
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Figure 13: Shows the NMRAT score versus self-reported spatial thinking ability and the 
trend line from the linear regression analysis. 
 
4.2.7. Cognitive Style Index 
 The values for the Cognitive Style questions in instrument three were calculated 
using the scoring guide and methodology prescribed by Cools et al. (2007).  An equation 
was created in Microsoft Excel that automated the score calculation and scored each 
respondent on each of the three Cognitive Styles; Planning, Knowing, and Creating.  
Automating the tabulation of values was done to speed the scoring process and reduce the 
possibility of human error in transcribing the data from the database to a results 
spreadsheet.   
On the Knowing Cognitive Style, values ranged from six to twenty with a median 
value of 15 and a standard deviation of 2.33.  The responses show a moderate left skewed 
unimodal distribution pattern with a skewness of -0.9661.  The excess kurtosis value of 
2.7416 means it has a peak that is larger than that of a standard normal distribution.   
 42 
 
 
Figure 14: Histogram showing the distribution of “Knowing Style” scores on the COSI. 
 
When looking at the table of average NMRAT scores for the knowing style value, 
the score of 6 is from only two responses and values of 8, 9, and 10 represent a single 
response each.  The linear regression model resulted in a near horizontal trend line.  The 
p-value from the analysis is also too high to be considered statistically significant at 
0.91258. 
 
Table 7: Shows the calculated average score by knowing cognitive style value. 
Knowing Style  Average Score
6  11 
7  N/A 
8  9 
9  17 
10  9 
11  N/A 
12  13.3 
13  12 
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14  12.28571429 
15  12.24242424 
16  12.60869565 
17  12.44 
18  12.35294118 
19  12 
20  11 
 
 
Figure 15: Shows the NMRAT score by the knowing cognitive style value and the trend 
line from the linear regression analysis. 
 
The Planning Style values ranged from twelve to thirty with a median of 21, mode 
of 23, and a standard deviation of 3.90.  Like the Knowing Cognitive Style, results of the 
Planning Cognitive Style show a very slight unimodal left skewed distribution with a 
skewness value of -0.1434.  The excess kurtosis value of -0.0619 gives the peak a very 
similar shape to that of a standard normal distribution.  The planning cognitive style was 
the only value that reached the statistical significance p-value threshold (p < .05) with a 
value of 0.00282 in the initial multiple linear regression analysis.  
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Figure 16: Histogram showing the distribution of “Planning Style” scores on the COSI. 
 
Table 8: Shows the calculated average score by planning cognitive style value. 
Planning Style Value  Average Score 
12  12.25
13  13
14  13
15  11
16  12.42857143
17  12.33333333
18  13.44444444
19  12.6875
20  12.9375
21  12.76923077
22  12.06666667
23  11.76190476
24  12.5625
25  13
26  11
27  11
28  12.16666667
29  9
30  10
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Figure 17: Shows the NMRAT score by the planning cognitive style value and the trend 
line from the linear regression analysis. 
 
The Creating Style had values from eleven to thirty-five with a median value of 
25, a mode of 26, and a standard deviation of 4.16.  The Creating Style also has a 
unimodal slight left skewed distribution with a skewness value of -0.3550.  The excess 
kurtosis value of 0.6529 means the data has a slightly sharper peak than the standard 
normal distribution peak. Similar to the knowing style, the number of responses 
comprising the creating cognitive style is more populated toward the higher values.  The 
linear regression analysis also produced a similarly horizontal trend line, although this 
one very slightly indicates a negative relationship.  The Creating Cognitive Style was not 
found to be statistically relevant with a p-value of 0.27529 in the initial multiple linear 
regression analysis.   
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Figure 18: Histogram showing the distribution of “Creating Cognitive Style” scores on 
the COSI. 
 
Table 9: Shows the calculated average score by creating cognitive style value. 
Creating Style 
Value  Average Score
11  13 
12  N/A 
13  14 
14  N/A 
15  11.75 
16  12 
17  9 
18  13.5 
19  12.14285714 
20  11.36363636 
21  13.71428571 
22  12.33333333 
23  13.57142857 
24  12.05555556 
25  13 
26  12.42857143 
27  12.07142857 
28  11.78571429 
29  12.7 
30  14 
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31  12.6 
32  11.5 
33  N/A 
34  N/A 
35  10.66666667 
 
 
Figure 19: Shows the NMRAT score by the Creating Cognitive Style value and the trend 
line from the linear regression analysis. 
 
4.3. Navigational Map Reading Ability - Dependent Variable 
 For instrument four, the self-location task of the NMRAT, scores ranged from 
seven to seventeen correct answers out of a possible twenty questions.  Correct answers 
were coded in to the ActionScript in the testing procedure and recorded an incorrect (“0”) 
or correct (“1”) response in the database.  These values were then totaled to determine the 
participant’s NMRAT score.   The median and mode score was 13 with a standard 
deviation of 1.60.  The highest score was 17 and the lowest was 7.  The results show a 
unimodal distribution skewed slightly to the left with a skewness value of -0.3862.  The 
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excess kurtosis value of 0.9617 means the data has a higher or sharper than standard 
peak. 
 
 
Figure 20: Score of participants on the NMRAT Self-Location Test. 
 
4.4. Regression Analysis 
The next task was to create a multiple linear regression model from the data 
collected to see how each independent variable influenced the dependent variable of self-
location ability.  All of the independent variables were included in the initial multiple 
regression model, the goal being to see if any one variable, or all of the independent 
variables collectively, could reliably predict the dependent value at a rate better than 
chance.  The results of the model showed an r-squared value of 0.1061, indicating that it 
could only account for about ten percent of the variability in the dependent variable given 
the data input by the independent variables.  The model had a p-value of 0.03552 which 
does make it statistically significant.  The model also indicated the planning cognitive 
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style as the only statistically significant variable within the model (defined as a p-value of 
less than or equal to 0.05).  The beta coefficient (Estimate column from Table 10) from 
the model indicated that for every point on the planning scale a participant increased their 
score on the self-location test decreased by .11 and can be seen in Figure 21.  The results 
of the regression are discussed individually and in more detail in the following chapter, 
Chapter V.  In looking at the correlation matrix (Table 11), there is no variable that 
appears to be highly correlated with any other variable.  Many of the variables show 
values very close to “0” indicating no correlation at all.  To be sure, an analysis of the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was performed (Table 12).  The results of the VIF do not 
show any signs of multicollinearity that is normally associated with values at or above 
“4” (Farrar and Gluaber, 1967). 
 
Table 10: Results from the linear regression model of independent variables versus the 
dependent variable of self-location.  *p<0.05 
Independent Variable Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-value Significance 
(p-value) 
Creating -0.041106 0.037539 -1.095 0.27529 
Planning -0.110266 0.036302 -3.037 0.00282* 
Knowing 0.007803 0.070951 0.11 0.91258 
Spatially 0.055445 0.069212 0.801 0.42437 
Analytically 0.058978 0.090823 0.649 0.51711 
Creatively -0.05283 0.09397 -0.562 0.57484 
Education -0.170544 0.167716 -1.017 0.31089 
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Age -0.153847 0.116475 -1.321 0.18860 
Gender -0.266021 0.257156 -1.034 0.30261 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Plot of Panning Cognitive Style values versus NMRAT Self-Location Score 
with the linear regression line. 
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Table 11: Correlation matrix shows none of the variables are highly correlated with any 
other variable.  The Knowing Cognitive Style with the Analytical thinking ability value is 
the highest correlation at .57. 
Age Gender Education Creatively Analytically Spatially Knowing Planning Creating Score
Age 1
Gender ‐0.07124 1
Education 0.232043 0.0522484 1
Creatively ‐0.06204 ‐0.010214 ‐0.13439375 1
Analytically ‐0.15704 ‐0.114769 0.065470895 0.210286801 1
Spatially ‐0.03845 ‐0.055587 0.135110266 0.335503967 0.401095565 1
Knowing ‐0.20579 0.0646223 0.091793039 0.087339289 0.57099026 0.16946459 1
Planning 0.01874 0.0758058 0.168460945 ‐0.23810252 0.076587481 0.06669134 0.2630058 1
Creating 0.174943 ‐0.081345 ‐0.12097862 0.501582798 0.078480211 0.13357795 0.07175538 ‐0.3055742 1
Score ‐0.16402 ‐0.101259 ‐0.12563671 0.014445433 0.085106844 0.04886879 ‐0.0100917 ‐0.2319741 ‐0.0393826 1  
 
Table 12: The Variance Inflation Factor table indicates that none of the variables raise a 
red flag for multicollinearity. 
Age Gender Education CreativelyAnalytically Spatially Knowing Planning Creating Score
Age 1.248967 0.084228 ‐0.31903 0.15668 0.039949 0.02943 0.297306 ‐0.11004 ‐0.3858 0.128483
Gender 0.084228 1.067069 ‐0.0626 ‐0.08727 0.239515 0.01782 ‐0.18099 ‐0.01247 0.099935 0.093223
Education ‐0.31903 ‐0.0626 1.174902 0.136338 ‐0.01674 ‐0.21388 ‐0.1374 ‐0.03244 0.158092 0.096166
Creatively 0.15668 ‐0.08727 0.136338 1.585271 ‐0.14994 ‐0.42022 0.043641 0.190395 ‐0.68777 0.061909
Analytical 0.039949 0.239515 ‐0.01674 ‐0.14994 1.826738 ‐0.51753 ‐0.9888 0.1206 0.116229 ‐0.07673
Spatially 0.02943 0.01782 ‐0.21388 ‐0.42022 ‐0.51753 1.371435 0.177345 ‐0.19466 ‐0.03681 ‐0.08196
Knowing 0.297306 ‐0.18099 ‐0.1374 0.043641 ‐0.9888 0.177345 1.759122 ‐0.45713 ‐0.31775 ‐0.01277
Planning ‐0.11004 ‐0.01247 ‐0.03244 0.190395 0.1206 ‐0.19466 ‐0.45713 1.369602 0.398557 0.301906
Creating ‐0.3858 0.099935 0.158092 ‐0.68777 0.116229 ‐0.03681 ‐0.31775 0.398557 1.584841 0.120208
Score 0.128483 0.093223 0.096166 0.061909 ‐0.07673 ‐0.08196 ‐0.01277 0.301906 0.120208 1.126877  
 
 
To further explore the results, a multiple linear regression was performed on the 
three variables from the COSI and resulted in an r-squared value of 0.07255, meaning the 
model is only able to predict about 7% of the variance seen in the dependent variable.  
This model was also statistically significant with a p-value of 0.009052.  The analysis 
also indicated that of the three independent variables, the Planning style was still the only 
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value to reach the statistical significance threshold of a p-value below 0.05 (as seen in 
Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Linear regression results from just the three COSI variables. (*) indicates a p-
value <  0.05 that is statistically significant. 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Knowing 0.0528 0.05634 0.937 0.3502 
Planning -0.12069 0.03528 -3.421 0.0008* 
Creating -0.05183 0.03195 -1.622 0.1068 
 
 A median split was performed on the scores from the NMRAT, categorizing the 
“good performers” and “bad performers” by dividing them along the median value of 13.  
Another multiple linear regression model was run on all of the independent variables 
(Table 14 for the good performers and 15 for the bad performers).   
The multiple linear regression model of the good performers resulted in an r-
squared value of 0.2817, indicating that the model with those variables as an input likely 
accounted for about twenty eight percent of the variance in the dependent variable of the 
NMRAT score.  This model was also statistically significant with a p-value of 0.001697.  
The model also found different significant variables than the previous model.  When just 
looking at the good performers, the Creating Cognitive Style, spatial thinking ability, and 
creative thinking ability emerged as being statistically significant (p-value < 0.05).  
 53 
 The multiple linear regression model for the bad performers resulted in an r-
squared value of 0.1406, meaning the model can likely account for about fourteen percent 
of the variation in the dependent variable.  The model was also not found to be 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.2256.  The regression analysis showed that 
none of the independent variables were statistically significant (See table 16). 
 
Table 14:  Linear regression results from all variables from participants that scored 13 or 
higher on the NMRAT. (*) Indicates a statistically significant finding with a p-value <.05 
 Estimate Std. Error t value  Pr(>|t|) 
Creating -0.06574 0.028785 -2.284 0.02534* 
Planning -0.00825 0.024966 -0.33 0.74199 
Knowing -0.04267 0.051346 -0.831 0.40872 
Spatially -0.16356 0.052681 -3.105 0.00272* 
Analytically -0.0453 0.059263 -0.764 0.44714 
Creatively 0.175993 0.064145 2.744 0.00766* 
Education 0.173775 0.121395 1.431 0.15662 
Gender 0.168441 0.107662 0.964 0.7639 
Age 0.007107 0.094246 0.075 0.9401 
 
Table 15: Linear regression results from all variables from participants that scored below 
13 on the NMRAT. (*) Indicates a statistically significant finding with a p-value <.05 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Creating -0.01946 0.037643 -0.517 0.607 
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Planning -0.04363 0.038215 -1.142 0.258 
Knowing -0.00185 0.069066 -0.027 0.979 
Spatially 0.100102 0.065742 1.523 0.133 
Analytically 0.124257 0.096038 1.294 0.2 
Creatively -0.09718 0.099522 -0.976 0.332 
Education -0.07326 0.16435 -0.446 0.658 
Gender -0.06425 0.143991 -0.318 0.71 
Age -0.03095 0.112415 -0.275 0.784 
 
 With respect to just the Cognitive Style Index results, a multiple linear regression 
analysis of the median split results of the good performers and bad performers was also 
conducted on just those three variables of Creating, Planning, and Knowing Cognitive 
Styles.  The model from the good performer group resulted in an r-squared value of 
0.1349, accounting for about 13.5% of the variation in the NMRAT score.  The model 
was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.01054.  That model also produced results 
similar to the previous model of good performers, that the Creating Cognitive Style was a 
statistically significant variable within the model (See Table 16).  The model from the 
results of the bad performers resulted in an r-squared value of 0.04516, meaning the 
model could only predict about 4.5% of the variation in the dependent variable and a p-
value of 0.3408 making the model not statistically significant.  As with the previous 
model of bad performers, which included all the variables, there were no individual 
variables that were found to be statistically significant in this model (see Table 17). 
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Table 16:  Linear regression results from the COSI variables from participants that scored 
13 or higher on the NMRAT. (*) Indicates a statistically significant finding with a p-
value <.05 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Creating -0.0575 0.02574 -2.235 0.0283* 
Planning -0.0276 0.02577 -1.069 0.2882 
Knowing -0.08309 0.04588 -1.811 0.074 
 
Table 17: Linear regression results from the COSI variables from participants that scored 
below 13 on the NMRAT. (*) Indicates a statistically significant finding with a p-value 
<.05 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Creating -0.04188 0.02938 -1.425 0.158 
Planning -0.04444 0.03718 -1.195 0.236 
Knowing 0.06081 0.05238 1.161 0.249 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. Discussion 
The results of the analysis provide mixed results.  One statistically significant 
finding of this research being that the Planning Cognitive Style is negatively related to 
the performance on the NMRAT self-location test with a beta value of -.11 (Table 10).  
The research question posed in Chapter I- “What is the relationship between age, gender, 
education level, spatial thinking ability, analytical thinking ability, creative thinking 
ability, cognitive style and navigational map reading ability?”- has a mixed answer.  As 
with many types of research involving behavior or cognitive processes, having a mixed 
answer is not a bad thing.  It is a very complicated task to attempt to predict a person’s 
ability on one task given the results from another task. 
In the initial regression analysis results that included all of the independent 
variables, only the planning cognitive style was found to have a statistically significant 
relationship with NMRAT score in this research.  In subsequent regression models that 
divided the sample population the Creating Cognitive Style, the ability to think 
creatively, and ability to think spatially emerged as significant variables within the 
populations that scored higher than the median on the NMRAT task.  The models of the 
bad performers, however, found no significant findings and had lower r-squared values 
than the models of good performers. 
This chapter will discuss the results of the analysis and show the relationship 
between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable.  Also, the 
 57 
relationship of the findings of this thesis will be discussed in the framework of previous 
published works.  The chapter will finish with concluding remarks about the findings of 
this thesis and possible avenues for further research to explore. 
 
5.1.1. Age  
The results for the age variable (see Table 1 and Figure 2) show performance on 
the NMRAT had a negative trend as participant age increased with a beta coefficient of -
.15 from the initial regression model (see Table 10).  The initial all-inclusive multiple 
linear regression analysis failed to report a statistically significant result using multiple 
linear regression modeling to corroborate the findings of previous research conducted on 
the influence of age on navigation ability that were outlined in Chapter II.  The p-value of 
the age variable in the linear regression model (see Table 10) for spatial thinking ability 
was 0.18860, needing p<.05 as the threshold for statistical significance.  The results from 
the additional median split performance based analysis of good and bad performers 
showed similar beta coefficients at 0.007 and -0.030 respectively.  Both of these 
additional models did not find age to be a significant predictor of performance.   
One potential drawback of this study with respect to the age variable was that a 
categorical age answer was used.  This made it impossible to break down the data in to 
smaller units for further analysis.  The category method was the result of a programming 
obstacle in the testing design and a timely solution could not be found. 
 
 
 
 58 
5.1.2. Gender 
 Results also do not offer concrete support for some of the previous research on 
gender and navigation.  Earlier studies had found that men used more Euclidian strategies 
(distance and direction) for navigation where women used landmarks (Dabbs et al. 1998; 
Choi and Silverman 1997; Galea and Kimura 1993; Miller and Santoni 1982; Ward et al. 
1986; Downs and Stea 1977).  Recall from Chapter IV that the results from this thesis 
reported a very similar average score for men and women (12.48 for the men and 12.15 
for the women) this would suggest that the NMRAT Self-location test performance is not 
significantly related to gender and information about participants using the Euclidian-
type solution or a landmark-type approach was not gathered.  The first multiple linear 
regression model did not sufficiently predict the data with a p-value of 0.30261 making 
the findings not statistically significant.  Subsequent models also found that gender was 
not a significant predictor of performance. 
 
5.1.3. Education 
 In looking at the education level of participants (Table 3) the data shows a decline 
in average score for the group that indicated having completed a graduate level degree 
(eg MS, MA, PhD, MD, or Law).  Like previous variables, analysis of the education 
variable in the multiple linear regression models failed to meet the p-value threshold for 
statistical significance with a value of 0.31089 in the first model.  This also held true 
when the sample population was divided based on performance with p values of 0.156 for 
good performers and 0.658 for bad performers.  This means that within this sample, 
education level is not a reliable predictor of performance. 
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The large population in the “some college” (forty responses) category and zero 
responses on the “high school” category would seem to indicate that participants attended 
a college at some point, although it does not distinguish between those currently in school 
and those that have dropped out without completing a degree.  This problem in this 
categorization could likely be solved by modifying future studies to distinguish between 
participants that are currently enrolled and those that are not by renaming the “some 
college” category as “currently attending college”.  This would likely create a distinction 
between current students and those that failed to obtain a degree and only have a high 
school education.   
 
5.1.4. Creative Thinking Ability 
Values for the self-reported creative thinking abilities do not show a strong 
pattern for higher scores being related to higher ability levels (see Table 5 and Figure 10).  
The low end of the scale does contain an average score that is lower than the upper end of 
the scale.  The peak average (13.2) in the “9” score could show an increase.  Also of note 
is the apparent increase at the “5” value, which occurs in the creative thinking ability 
table.  The first multiple linear regression model for creative thinking ability resulted in a 
p-value of 0.57484.  When looking at just the good performers, those that scored above 
average, creative thinking ability was indicated as being one of three significant variables 
in the regression analysis with a p-value of 0.00766.  The beta coefficient value of 0.175 
would indicate that among the good performers their self-reported assessment of their 
creative thinking ability is positively related to their performance on the NMRAT.  
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5.1.5. Analytical Thinking Ability 
 The analytical thinking ability variable did not yield any statistically significant 
results.  Similar to the creative thinking ability the first all-inclusive multiple linear 
regression model, the analytical thinking ability resulted in a p-value of 0.51711.  In the 
regression model created from the good performers’ data, analytical thinking ability was 
also not found to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.44714.  The results from 
the multiple linear regression model of the bad performers further supported the other 
models and found analytical thinking ability to not be significant with a p-value of 0.2. 
 
5.1.6. Spatial Thinking Ability 
 Recall the research cited in Chapter II that found that a self-reported value of 
spatial ability was previously found to be a reliable predictor of ability on spatial ability 
tasks (Cornell et al., 2003).  My study found mixed results with regards.  The p-value of 
the spatial thinking ability variable in the first linear regression model (see Table 10) was 
0.42437, well above the p<.05 threshold for statistical significance.  When just looking at 
the results from the good performers, however, the spatial thinking ability variable 
became a significant variable in the multiple linear regression analysis with a p-value of 
0.00272 (see Table 15). 
The average NMRAT score appears relatively uniform across the range of spatial 
ability values reported by participants.  Contributing to this may be the small sample 
populations for the lower values with only nineteen of the one hundred and fifty seven 
participants reporting a value of four or lower.  Also of interest is the most frequently 
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reported value, “8”, also had the highest average score and was 1.09 and .55 higher than 
the average scores for the “9” and “10” categories, respectively. 
 The results of the three self-reported ability metrics show a slight positive trend in 
ability level and navigational map reading ability as seen in the positive beta coefficients 
reported in the first linear regression model (Table 10).  The results from previous studies 
on ability tests have indicated that higher scores on general abilities tests show a positive 
correlation on a spatial cognition test (Thorndyke and Stasz 1980; Sholl and Egeth 1982; 
Lloyd and Steinke 1984; Streeter and Vitello 1986; Kovach, Surrette, and Aamodt 1988).  
The results from this thesis do not uniformly support those previous findings due to two 
of the ability values having opposing slope values positive on the linear regression 
models and being considered statistically significant in the linear regression model for 
good performers (Table 13).  Spatial thinking ability has a negative slope while creative 
thinking ability is has a positive slope.  The lack of significance in the bad performers is 
interesting though and would be an interesting avenue for another study on performance 
differences. 
 
5.1.7. Knowing Cognitive Style 
People with a Knowing Cognitive Style rely heavily on having all the facts and 
data in their efforts to solve problems.  Recall back to Chapter IV(figure 14) that the 
values of Knowing Cognitive Style were skewed with the values between fourteen and 
eighteen comprising 128 of the 157 responses received.  Conclusions from the data are 
hard to come to as there is not a clear relationship present in the data.  The initial all-
inclusive multiple linear regression model did not report a statistically significant 
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relationship between the Knowing Cognitive Style value and score on the NMRAT, 
indicating that NMRAT score is not significantly influenced by the knowing cognitive 
style value.  The p-value from the analysis is also too high to obtain statistical 
significance at 0.91258, the highest among all the independent variables.  The second 
multiple linear regression analysis that just included the Cognitive Style Index variables 
still did not find the Knowing Cognitive Style to be significant with a p-value of 0.3502.  
All four of the performance-based multiple linear regression models had similar results, 
indicating that the Knowing Cognitive Style was not found to be statistically significant 
variable in predicting NMRAT score. 
 
5.1.8. Creating Cognitive Style 
 Creating Style people like creativity and exploration and are less interested in 
practical applications.  Similar to the Knowing Style, the number of responses comprising 
the Creating Cognitive style is skewed with more responses found in the higher values.  
The first multiple linear regression analysis also produced a p-value too large to be 
statistically relevant though with a p-value of 0.27529.  The second multiple linear 
regression model that just included the Cognitive Style Index variables (Table 14) also 
found the Creating Cognitive Style to not be statistically significant with a p-value of 
.1068, which is close to being considered marginally significant.  When looking at just 
the results of the good performers, those with a NMRAT score of 13 or above, the 
Creating Cognitive Style was found to be a statistically significant variable in that model 
with a p-value of 0.02534.  The model that only included the values from the good 
performers on the three Cognitive Style variables also found the Creating Cognitive Style 
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to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0283.  The two models that used the 
results of the bad performers, those scoring less than 13 on the NMRAT did not return a 
statistically significant finding for the Creating Cognitive Style. 
 
5.1.9. Planning Cognitive Style 
One of the main attributes of the Planning Cognitive Style is the need for 
structure.  They also are averse to ambiguity and prefer clarity and order.  As stated in the 
beginning of this chapter, the planning cognitive style was initially the only value that 
reached the statistical significance p-value threshold (p < .05) with a value of 0.00282.  
The beta coefficient from that analysis was -.11 (Table 10). The second multiple linear 
regression analysis that only looked at the three COSI independent variables also found 
the Planning Cognitive Style to be a statistically significant variable in the model with a 
p-value of 0.0008.  The second model found Planning Cognitive Style to be more 
significant among just the three COSI variables.  The beta coefficient from that analysis 
was similar at a value of -.12 indicating that there is a very slight negative relationship 
between Planning Cognitive Style score and score on the NMRAT task.  In the initial all-
inclusive multiple linear regression analysis the results suggest that the traits specific to 
the Planning Cognitive Style negatively influence a person’s ability on navigational map 
reading tasks.  Further analysis did not find Planning Cognitive Style to be a significant 
variable within subsequent models that divided the sample population based on NMRAT 
performance.  When looking at the different performance groups, the Planning Cognitive 
Style was not found to be statistically significant in any of the four models. 
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5.2. Conclusion 
 Studying cognitive processes can be a difficult task with results not presenting a 
clear indication of what is happening or how to interpret them.  Navigation and spatial 
cognition are very complex tasks that researchers are just beginning to explore and 
understand.  This thesis included a new way to compare Cognitive Style and ability to 
navigation ability by including a Cognitive Style measure.  With the mixed results 
discussed here there is potential that with further exploration and refinement of the 
methods, Cognitive Style research may prove useful to understanding more about 
navigation and spatial cognition processes. 
The research presented in this thesis failed to offer any statistically significant 
results that support previous research conclusions about the effect of age on navigation 
ability.  This thesis also does not show a significant gender related performance 
difference on the self-location task of the NMRAT with enough difference to be 
significant.  The results from the self-reported thinking ability portion found that within 
the good performers, creative and spatial thinking abilities were found to be significant 
variables in the multiple linear regression models.  The results of the regression analysis 
performed on the COSI variables did indicate that the Planning Cognitive Style score was 
statistically significant within the all-inclusive regression model and the COSI variable 
model that included both good and bad performers.  This finding was not supported by 
subsequent analysis of the good and bad performance groups.  Instead, the good 
performance group analysis found the Creating Cognitive Style, creative thinking ability, 
and spatial thinking ability to be statistically significant. 
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 The multiple linear regression model in this analysis that could best model that 
data was the model created from the good performers that included all the variables 
which had an r-squared value of 0.2817, meaning the variables that were included 
account for about 28% of the variation in the dependent variable.  The model that used 
data from the bad performance group and only the three COSI variables had the lowest r-
squared value at 0.04516, accounting for a mere 4.5% of the variation seen in the 
NMRAT score.  Four of the six regression models were found to be statistically 
significant.  The two models that only included the results from the low performance 
group did not result in a statistically significant finding. 
  Further study is needed that includes different cognitive styles to see if there is 
one that can more reliably predict NMRAT scores.  Future studies could also address 
using a Cognitive Style test to identify navigation performance groups.  I would make the 
suggestion to expand the self-reported thinking value questions to include actual aptitude 
tests such as the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale for spatial ability.  Also I would 
suggest changing the education classifications as well as recording a numerical value for 
age rather that a categorical value to re-evaluate their importance in the event a potential 
bias was introduced by my methods.   
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APPENDIX 
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